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MPEG LA’S USE OF A PATENT POOL TO SOLVE THE CRISPR 





Since 2012, CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short 
Palindromic Repeats) technology has revolutionized how scientists 
approach gene editing. CRISPR allows for easier modification and 
alteration of the genome. This technology has potential applications 
ranging from correcting genetic defects to the treatment and prevention of 
diseases—CRISPR’s potential upside is unquestionable. However, 
CRISPR’s current patent landscape presents a variety of roadblocks for 
research, innovation, and profit. This Note discusses the potential use of a 
patent pool to alleviate some of these roadblocks. This Note begins with a 
discussion of the independent administrative body attempting to create 
such a patent pool, MPEG LA, before discussing the current patent 
landscape. Next, it discusses the licensing issues biotech products face 
when attempting to create a patent pool. Finally, this Note analyzes the 
prospects of MPEG LA’s current attempt to create a patent pool in the 
CRISPR arena. This analysis discusses why a CRISPR patent pool would 
work, as well as arguments suggesting its failure. This Note ultimately 
concludes that, while there are many barriers which could impede a 
CRSIPR patent pool’s success, MPEG LA’s patent pool is a promising 
approach to a complex licensing problem in a budding technological area.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In June of 2012, scientists at the University of California Berkeley (“UC 
Berkeley”) created a new method for genome editing called “CRISPR.”1 CRISPR, 
or Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, loosely refers to 
various systems that can be “programmed to target specific stretches of genetic code 
and to edit DNA at precise locations.”2 The simplest ways to think about this 
innovation are a pair of scissors that can cut DNA at a precise location, or a word-
                                               
* © 2020 Patrick Neville. J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. The author thanks Kristin Neuman for her helpful comments and discussion. 
1 Knut J. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRISPR–Cas Gene Editing 
Technology, 34 NATURE 1025, 1026 (2016). This paper discusses the licensing issues 
surrounding the CRISPR-Cas9 patents, hereinafter referred to as “CRISPR.” 
2 Questions and Answers About CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/ 
what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr [https://perma 
.cc/U7ES-8MQW] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
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processor that allows scientists to precisely change DNA, similar to how a word-
processor fixes a typo.3 This technology has the potential to permanently modify 
genes in living organisms and possibly, in the future, may be used to correct 
mutations at precise locations in the human genome to treat genetic diseases.4 The 
rapid advancements and potential uses of CRISPR-related technology have created 
many ethical,5 intellectual property, and licensing concerns in the biotechnology 
sphere. 
Biotechnology6 is the “manipulation (as through genetic engineering) of living 
organisms or their components to produce useful, and usually, commercial 
products.”7 This industry covers products and processes involving human 
therapeutics, bio-pharmacy, bio-agriculture, bio-services, and bio-industrial 
                                               
3 Id.  
4 See id.; Jennifer Doudna, How CRISPR Lets Us Edit Our DNA, TED (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/jennifer_doudna_we_can_now_edit_our_dna_but_let_s_do_it_
wisely [https://perma.cc/PWY3-55V3] (explaining how scientists in Philadelphia have 
showed that they can remove the DNA of an “integrated HIV virus from infected human 
cells.”); Paul Knoepfler, The Ethical Dilemma of Designer Babies, TED (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/paul_knoepfler_the_ethical_dilemma_of_designer_babies/detail
s [https://perma.cc/G373-Y3MY] (discussing how parents soon could choose “advantageous 
traits” for their in vitro child); Emily Mullin, Arming Bodies with CRISPR to Fight 
Huntington’s Disease and ALS, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608967/arming-bodies-with-crispr-to-fight-hunting 
tons-disease-and-als/ [https://perma.cc/56H8-P36H] (explaining the potential for genetic 
diseases to be eliminated); Kelly Servick, CRISPR Slices Virus Genes Out of Pigs, but Will 
It Make Organ Transplants to Humans Safer?, SCI. MAG. (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/crispr-slices-virus-genes-out-pigs-will-it-make-
organ-transplants-humans-safer [https://perma.cc/78ET-Y7Q2] (discussing how patients on 
organ transplant lists could receive surgery without having to wait years); Simon Worrall, 
We Could Resurrect the Woolly Mammoth. Here’s How., NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 8, 2017), 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/woolly-mammoths-extinction-cloning-
genetics/ [https://perma.cc/HN66-DZH3] (noting how extinct animals could be brought back 
to existence, specifically, the possible resurrection of the woolly mammoth).  
5 The many ethical concerns surrounding genome editing and CRISPR technology can 
and have filled their own paper(s). See, e.g., Niklaus H. Evitt et al., Human Germline 
CRISPR-Cas Modification: Toward a Regulatory Framework, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25 
(2015), (discussing the ethical implications of CRISPR technologies and the need for a 
regulatory framework); Alvaro P. Reyes & Fredrik Lanner, Towards a CRISPR View of Early 
Human Development: Applications, Limitations and Ethical Concerns of Genome Editing in 
Human Embryos, 144 THE COMPANY OF BIOLOGISTS 3 (2017), http://dev.biologists.org/con 
tent/develop/144/1/3.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7JD-L4AU] (discussing the ethical 
considerations of editing human pre-implantation embryos using CRISPR Cas9 technology). 
However, such ethical concerns are largely outside the scope of this paper. 
6 Hereinafter referred to as “biotech.”  
7 Biotechnology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
biotechnology [https://perma.cc/7ZCV-F78Q] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).  
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applications.8 It is a lucrative industry that was valued in 2015 at over $330.3 billion 
and, in all likelihood, is only going to continue to grow.9  
The biotech industry, and specifically the CRISPR field, presents a foray of 
licensing issues that could impact future research, innovation, and profits.10 
However, in 2000, a report conducted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office suggested that a patent pool could be a useful licensing tool for biotech, 
“serv[ing] the interests of both the public and private industry, a win-win 
situation.”11 A patent pool forms when multiple patentees combine their patents and 
use a single independent entity to license all of the combined patents to third-parties 
as a single package.12 This package of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) is then 
licensed on a non-exclusive basis, providing licensees with affordability and 
freedom to operate, while giving licensors adequate royalty returns.13 MPEG LA, 
for example, is an independent licensing agent attempting to create a patent pool for 
licensing in the CRISPR sphere.14  
A patent pool could alleviate the licensing burdens in the CRISPR sphere, but 
the biotech industry introduces business and scientific factors that can cause 
licensing roadblocks for a patent pool.15 Because CRISPR technology has many 
applications,16 it is essential that there be a licensing scheme available which allows 
information sharing while providing compensation for patent holders.17 This Note 
                                               




10 See infra Section III.A for discussion on the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” and the 
licensing issues that could be solved using a patent pool.  
11 Jeanne Clark et al., Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in 
Biotechnology Patents?, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 11 (Dec. 5, 2000), 
http://www.consultstanton.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PATENT-POOL-WHITE-
PAPER.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV6Z-2TXH]; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Policy Forum, The 
Anticommons at 20: Concerns for Research Continue, 361 SCIENCE 335, 337 (2018) 
(showing that a patent pool is a potential solution to the licensing problems in the CRISPR 
sphere specifically).  
12 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 134 (2000).  
13 See id. at 135; Richard J. Gilbert, Ties that Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent 
Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 26 (2010). 
14 MPEG LA, CRISPR, The Initiative, http://www.mpegla.com/main/pid/CRISPR/Init 
iative.aspx [https://perma.cc/QZ87-9WBM] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter MPEG 
LA, CRISPR] .  
15 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, Executive Director, Biotechnology Licensing, 
MPEG LA, to Patrick Neville, Student at the S.J. Quinney College of Law (Oct. 11, 2018, 
02:35 MST) (on file with author). 
16 See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion on the potential life-saving 
and world-changing uses of CRISPR technology. 
17 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
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will discuss (II) the requisite background information on patent pools in general, the 
MPEG LA licensing administration, and the current state of the CRISPR patent 
landscape, (III) the licensing issues facing patent pools in biotech, and (IV) an 
analysis of MPEG LA’s potential pool. This Note ultimately concludes that, 
although there are many barriers which could impede its success, MPEG LA’s 
CRISPR patent pool is a promising approach to solving a complex licensing problem 
in a budding technological area. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  What Is a Patent Pool? 
 
1.  Patent Pool Background 
 
A patent pool forms when multiple patentees combine their patents and use a 
single entity to license all the combined patents to third-parties as a single, non-
exclusive licensing package.18 These pools can be useful for licensees because they 
provide affordability and the convenience of “one-stop shopping.”19 This convenient 
package of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) allows licensees to avoid the danger 
of paying and negotiating for rights that might be useless on its own.20 The 
advantages of a patent pool include the ability to overcome patent licensing 
roadblocks,21 reduce transaction costs, prevent potential downstream litigation, 
promote information exchange,22 and in a sense, “compress[] [the licensing] process 
into a single event.”23 This results in a secondary benefit—reducing the odds that a 
patent holder will strategically hold out for higher fees.24 Ideally, patent pools serve 
to regularize and stabilize technology transfer and licensing in a certain field of use.25 
                                               
18 Shapiro, supra note 12, at 134. 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 For example, patent pools allow coordination of the licensing of complementary 
patent rights in a single transaction and they can eliminate a potential licensee’s burden of 
conducting extensive patent searching in particular technological areas. Michael Mattioli & 
Robert P. Merges, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent Pools, 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 
281, 295–96 (2017). 
22 See Richard J. Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations: A Guide to Benefits, Costs 
and Antitrust Safeguards, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 125, 125–26 (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2017) [hereinafter Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations]; Michael 
Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 IND. UNIV. L. REV. 103, 117 (2012). 
23 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 285. 
24 Id. at 285–86.  
25 ROBERT P. MERGES, INSTITUTIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: 
THE CASE OF PATENT POOLS 6, 16 (Aug. 1999), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/pools. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/VF6H-W3Z9]. 
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For a pool to be stable, it should include “essential” and “complementary” IPR.26 
“Essential” patents are ones that are valid and, “absent a license, necessarily 
infringed by products covered by the pool’s licensing program.”27 Similarly, patents 
can be “complements” to one another when they are essential to make, use, or sell a 
product.28 
Classically, the creation of a patent pool involves four major characteristics: 
(1) it is built around the voluntary inclusion of essential and complementary IPR 
holders;29 (2) it relies on a standard;30 (3) it requires pool administrators to conduct 
an in-depth and continual search of the patent landscape;31 and (4) it can be subject 
to anticompetition laws.32 Thus, a patent pool must be open to all IPR holders, but 
                                               
26 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 134–35 (discussing how the standard must include all 
patents, essential and complementary, to utilize the technology); see also Gilbert, supra note 
13, at 7 (discussing how “essential” patents are ones that have no economically viable 
substitutes, a party needs a license to utilize the IPR. “Complementary” patents are ones 
where if the price of one patented product should increase, the demand for the other product 
would decrease. Essential patents, by their nature, are complementary when one patent is not 
useful without access to the other); Timo Minssen et al., Clearing a Way Through the 
CRISPR Patent Jungle, LSIPR (May 8, 2018), https://www.mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads 
/2019/02/Clearing-a-way-through-the-CRISPR-patent-jungle.pdf [https://perma.cc/29T5-
GD9V] (noting how for CRISPR patents, where the landscape is fragmented, essential 
patents will almost always be complementary to other IPR).  
27 Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations, supra note 22, at 135. 
28 Id. at 133.  
29 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 134; Sophie Lawrance et al., The Competition Law 
Issues of the CRISPR Patent Pool, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=62ef2525-a34c-4e5e-b401-ea0c90082374 [https://perma.cc/ZS2F-
H6WQ]. 
30 A standard is an attempt to encapsulate the details and patents necessary to enable 
“uniformity of practice across a diverse range of implementations.” CHARLES M. SCHMIDT, 
BEST PRACTICES FOR TECHNICAL STANDARD CREATION: GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN, 
SOCIALIZATION, FORMALIZATION, AND ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS v 
(MITRE 2017). Note that the CRISPR-related patents and the research itself does not involve 
the use of a standard and this is one major licensing roadblock for the potential pool. See 
Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
31 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 134–35; Lawrance et al., supra note 29. 
32 See MERGES, supra note 25, at 28; Lawrance et al., supra note 29. (discussing how 
the fear of competition laws can be greatly reduced by reviewing pooled patents regularly 
and by considering the licensing aspect of the pool separately); Shapiro, supra note 12, at 
132–33, 136. Anticompetition laws are largely outside the scope of this paper because any 
issues regarding anticompetition laws and patent pools has largely been resolved since 1997 
when the Department of Justice granted MPEG LA procompetitive clearance. Steven C. 
Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 371 (1999).  
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each patent must be individually examined and analyzed to determine if it is 
necessary before possible inclusion.33  
Similarly, something patent pools should do is allow members to license their 
patents independently outside the pool.34 If the pool lacks this quality, the integrity 
of the single licensed package may be called into question and fracturing can occur, 
because licensees may think the pool contains substitute patents—patents which 
could be licensed independently as a substitute for the patents included in the pool—
which could force lower prices in the market.35  
 
2.  Economics 
 
From an economic standpoint, patent pools are designed to conserve transaction 
costs.36 For licensees, a pool can reduce the number of negotiations when there is a 
patent thicket,37 or diffusion of IPR, and it can simultaneously coordinate the 
licensing of complementary rights.38 Since there has been a rise in patent litigation, 
licensees have begun conducting “freedom-to-operate” analyses,39 but a pool can 
reduce this cost as its administrators must conduct these analyses to determine the 
essential and complementary nature of the included patents.40  
The simplest incentive for patentees to join a pool would be a royalty that would 
exceed what the patentee could earn if it defected and licensed independently.41 
However, there are at least three other financial reasons to join a pool outside of 
royalties. First, each patentee in the pool generally gets “grantback” licenses (non-
exclusive licenses) to all IPR included in the pool and improvements made from said 
IPR.42 These grantback licenses are usually given at a standard rate or a royalty-free 
rate.43 For patentees, grantback licenses provide IPR that they otherwise wouldn’t 
                                               
33 See Lawrance et al., supra note 29 (discussing how pool administrators, like MPEG 
LA, utilize independent experts who analyze both the patent landscape and potential patents 
themselves before inclusion). 
34 Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations, supra note 22, at 130–38. 
35 Id. at 139–40.  
36 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 287.  
37 A patent thicket is “[a]n overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking 
to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.” Shapiro, supra 
note 12, at 119.  
38 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 293, 296. 
39 A “freedom-to-operate” analysis is an expensive endeavor. Id. at 293. A freedom-to-
operate analysis “yields a list of potential patent holders, the prospective licensee must then 
contact and successfully negotiate a license with each one.” Id. The negotiation process then 
places costs upon both the licensee and patent holders, including, “salaries paid to business 
personnel who conduct the deals and fees or salaries paid to lawyers who draft the 
agreements.” Id.  
40 Id. at 294. 
41 Gilbert, supra note 13, at 26.  
42 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 296–97, 343. 
43 Id. 296–97.  
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have had rights to in the form of improvements.44 For the pool and potential 
licensees, grant-back licenses prevent patent holders from charging royalties that 
interfere with the adoption or utilization of products covered by the pool.45 Second, 
patent pools can act as a mechanism to reduce litigation, and the costs associated 
therewith, between patentees.46  
Third, all parties involved will reduce their licensing costs as they will not have 
to pay large-salary employees, such as lawyers, to negotiate multiple, lengthy 
licenses.47 In 2017, Robert Merges and Michael Mattioli conducted one of the first 
empirical studies showing how much money patent pools save its participants.48 This 
study used two successful pools (including one administered by MPEG LA) and 
determined that, “even at a moderate cost per license, the availability of a standard 
form ‘rate schedule’ type license lowers the costs of transferring patent rights to 
licensees by a huge amount.”49 They estimate that a successful patent pool conserved 
transaction costs for all parties involved on a scale of hundreds of millions of 
dollars.50 
 
3.  Non-Financial Incentives 
 
In addition to the financial reasons discussed in the previous section, there are 
other, non-financial reasons patentees may favor patent pool over traditional 
licensing techniques. For platform-based technologies, the patentees may join a pool 
in an attempt to spread the adoption of the platform.51 Other reasons for patentees to 
join a patent pool include: ease of administration,52 as a reaction to government 
threats of compulsory licensing,53 as a means of breaking through patent thickets 
based on the belief that broadening the base of licensees is the best way to maximize 
                                               
44 Id. at 343.  
45 Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations, supra note 22, at 145 (noting that grantback 
licenses can harm competition if it enables a patentee to prevent the development of rival 
technology).  
46 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 297. 
47 Id. at 304–05. 
48 See id. at 281. 
49 Id. at 324. 
50 See id. (“The patent pools we studied saved, we estimate, $600 million and almost 
$400 million, respectively.”). 
51 Id. at 333–34. It should be noted that the CRISPR pool is a platform-based pool, 
where the patentees are pooling patents related to the underlying CRISPR platform. Email 
from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
52 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 334.  
53 Ed Levy et al., Patent Pools and Genomics: Navigating A Course to Open Science?, 
16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 80–81 (2010) (“This is, in large part, what occurred with 
respect to airplanes when the U.S. government determined that a group of patent holders was 
blocking its efforts to [scale up] aircraft manufacturing for the conduct of WWI.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
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profits,54 to create an arrangement more “commensurate with the norms of open 
science. . . ,”55 or based on the short-term goal of avoiding litigation.56 Along similar 
lines, in biosciences, a patent pool could be a philanthropic instrument, used to 
increase access to medicines and improve global health.57 
For example, in 2009, the Medicines Patent Pool (“MPP”) gained IPR due to 
government pressure.58 The pool was formed to develop treatments for HIV in 
developing nations, which the World Health Organization deemed a “global health 
emergency.”59 HIV drugs were not reaching developing nations largely because of 
high transaction costs on the necessary patents.60 The pool was structured to offer 
royalties on future product sales in exchange for licenses for drug developers to 
facilitate research and development of pediatric HIV pills.61 The integral pressures 
which led to its formation came in the form of political, governmental, and media 
pressures.62 One hundred and fifty members of the British parliament signed a 
petition calling on private companies to join, and British politicians went on national 
media outlets to market the pool.63 The pool struggled to gather members until July 
of 2011, when Gilead Sciences joined.64 In the following year, after Gilead joined, 
MPP’s license allowed for the production and distribution of four drugs in over one 
hundred low-income nations.65 
Similarly, in 2009 the U.S. government induced the creation of the Neglected 
Tropical Disease (“NTD”) pool as a way to generate innovation for the treatment of 
neglected tropical diseases.66 Neglected tropical diseases are not a large money-
making area, and interest in the sphere was lacking until the government offered 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) priority review vouchers for future drugs 
and patents in exchange for patent inclusion.67 Commentators have stated that the 
NTD pool’s success came from the FDA vouchers, as well as the fact that the pool 
                                               
54 Id. at 81 (noting that this was the motivation for MPEG LA to create the MPEG 2 
patent pool).  
55 Id. (arguing that patent pools make affordable licenses more available thus, more 
licensees will create more upstream research and downstream commercialization).  
56 Mattioli, supra note 22, at 120. 
57 Levy et al., supra note 53, at 81.  
58 Mattioli, supra note 22, at 133.  
59 Id. at 121.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 122.  
62 Id. at 122–23.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 125. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 126–27 (noting that these “vouchers” can be used “to obtain expedited FDA 
review on future products of the holder’s choosing, or alternatively, they could be 
transferred.”).  
 
2020] PATENT POOL TO SOLVE CRISPR LICENSING 543 
 
was designed around researching new drugs rather than lowering transactional costs 
for existing ones.68 
Other biotech pools have formed based on philanthropic and social reasons. 
For example, in 2000, the Golden Rice Pool was organized as a non-profit that 
granted a package free of charge to developing nations.69 Although patentees got 
nothing in return, they may have been motivated by the public good or an attempt to 
achieve widespread use of their platform.70 Similarly, in 2004, another non-profit 
pool formed in an attempt to quell the severe acute respiratory syndrome (“SARS”) 
outbreak, in the hope that the pool would get a cost-effective SARS vaccine to 
market.71 However, this pool never caught on. This failure could be due to the fact 
that the pool was formed around patents still in the application phase (i.e. still being 
prosecuted in front of the United States Patent and Trademark Office), before any 
patent rights have been granted, making their future value uncertain.72 Another 
theory is that the relationship between the potential commercial product and the 
patents’ underlying technology is complex and undetermined, requiring a lengthy 
research and development process that made “patent essentiality” hard to 
determine.73 
It should also be noted that there have been for-profit patent pools in the biotech 
sphere. In 2012, the Librassay® pool was launched by MPEG LA based on genetic 
diagnostic testing patents.74 Librassay® started with about 400 patents and operated 
as a “supermarket,” making essential patents available on nonexclusive, 
nondiscriminatory terms.75 Diagnostic patents were chosen because they are more 
of a “component based” technology (which are more classically susceptible to patent 
pooling) and it is a commercially focused area where players in the market have the 
common goal of providing accurate testing.76 The pool’s success, however, was 
limited. At its inception, nine well-respected U.S. institutions decided to participate 
and MPEG LA licensed to several firms for diagnostic testing, life science research, 
and medical devices.77 Then, in 2012, in Librassay’s second year of existence, the 
pool suffered the effects of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Mayo 
                                               
68 Id. at 126 (stating that members of the group include large research institutions such 
as MIT and University of California, Berkeley).  
69 Thomas D. Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, On the Challenges Facing Patent Pooling in 
Biotechnology, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 113, 116 (2014).  
70 Mattioli, supra note 22, at 144–45.  
71 Jeitschko & Zhang, supra note 69, at 116.  
72 Levy et al., supra note 53, at 91. 
73 Id. 
74 Jeitschko & Zhang, supra note 69, at 116. 
75 Id. at 117. 
76 Id.  
77 Ester Van Zimmerman, IP Coordination Models: Revealing Some of the ‘Magic’ 
Behind Patent Pools and Clearinghouses?, in USER GENERATED LAW: RE-CONSTRUCTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 115, 140 (Thomas Riis ed., 
2016).  
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Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,78 and Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.79, 80 These cases “considerably limited 
the patent eligibility of diagnostics methods” resulting in less of a patent thicket and 
a diminished need for a patent pool.81 Recently, Kristin Neuman, MPEG LA’s 
Executive Director of Biotechnology Licensing, stated, “Due to the adverse effects 
of the Mayo and Myriad Supreme Court decisions, the [Librassay] program is no 
longer operating.”82 
 
B.  MPEG LA 
 
The third-party entity who is attempting to form the CRISPR patent pool is 
“MPEG LA,”83 a private company based in Denver, Colorado.84 MPEG LA is an 
independent licensing administrator, the “world’s leading packager” of patent pools, 
which facilitates the market by “creating reasonable access and profitable 
opportunities for everyone.”85  
For example, MPEG LA rolled out the MPEG-2 pool in 1995 for digital media 
and compression technology.86 The pool licensed the MPEG-2 standard in a single 
package consisting of essential patents and the basic complementary technology.87 
Thus, to create a one-stop licensing package, the first thing a patent pool must do is 
gather IPR. To gather the necessary patents, MPEG LA uses independent patent 
experts to determine whether a patent seeking inclusion into the pool is essential or 
complementary.88 For MPEG-2, MPEG LA also included what it called “Related 
                                               
78 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
79 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
80 Zimmerman, supra note 77, at 140–41. 
81 Id.  
82 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, Executive Director, Biotechnology Licensing, MPEG 
LA, to Patrick Neville, Student at the S.J. Quinney College of Law (Jan. 18, 2019 07:20 
MST) (on file with author). 
83 MPEG LA, CRISPR, supra note 14. 
84 Company Overview of MPEG LA, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4458054 [https://perma.cc/672D-ZVVU] 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2019); MPEG LA, NY-BEST, https://www.ny-best.org/page/mpeg-la 
[https://perma.cc/GHC9-9HBL] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).  
85 MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/ [https://perma.cc/L5EQ-L893] (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2019).  
86 See MERGES, supra note 25, at 28.  
87 Id. at 30. 
88 To determine whether a patent is critical to the pool, MPEG LA had its lawyers study 
over 8,000 abstracts owned by over 100 companies, narrowing the field down to 27 essential 
patents. MERGES, supra note 25, at 30. The Department of Justice stated that this 
“independent-expert mechanism . . . help[s] ensure that the portfolio will contain only patents 
that are truly essential to the MPEG-2 standard, weeding out patents that are competitive 
alternates to each other.” Shapiro, supra note 12, at 135. 
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Patents” or classic improvement patents which add value to the standard by 
implementing, building upon, or employing said standard.89  
However, unlike MPEG-2, no technological standard exists in the CRISPR 
sphere.90 This lack of a technical standard drove MPEG LA to develop its “CRISPR-
Cas9 Reference Model,” which describes how patent essentiality will be determined 
with respect to the CRISPR platform.91 If a patent meets the established criteria, it 
will be eligible for inclusion into the pool.92 The Reference Model is purposefully 
broad, seeking patents intended to encompass the entire CRISPR platform.93 
Because this platform could change due to advancements in technology, MPEG LA 
created the Reference Model so that the pool’s scope can be expanded or altered.94 
Inclusion requires that at least one claim95 is directed to:  
 
[T]he CRISPR-Cas9 System (as defined below) or any of its 
elements; a composition of matter containing the CRISPR-Cas9 System 
or any of its elements; a composition of matter derived from use of the 
CRISPR-Cas9 System or any of its elements; or a method of use, or a 
method of manufacture, pertaining to any of the foregoing.96  
 
Specifically, the CRISPR-Cas9 System is defined as: 
 
(1) DNA-targeting RNA comprising: (a) a CRISPR targeting RNA 
(“crRNA”) that hybridizes or is capable of hybridizing with a target DNA 
sequence in the operative environment, and (b) a trans-activating crRNA 
(“tracrRNA”) that is associated, associates or is capable of associating 
with the crRNA to facilitate the formation of a complex, in the operative 
environment, with the Cas9 protein of element (2) below; and 
 
                                               
89 MERGES, supra note 25, at 30. 
90 Due to the lack of interoperability and compatibility in biotech research, there is not 
one standard that is used for all applications. See Minssen et al., supra note 26.  
91 See MPEG LA, CRISPR-CAS9 REFERENCE MODEL FOR MPEG LA’S CRISPR-CAS9 
JOINT LICENSING PLATFORM VERSION 1.0, at 2 (2017), https://www.mpegla.com/wp-
content/uploads/CRISPR-Cas9-Reference-Model-24-Apr-2017.pdf [hereinafter REFERENCE 
MODEL].  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 4. 
94 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
95 “[T]he patent claim is the basic source from which the subject matter of the patent 
right is determined.” R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS 4–10 (4th ed. 2012); see 
also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996) (“The claim 
define[s] the scope of a patent grant, and functions to forbid not only exact copies of an 
invention, but products that go to the heart of an invention but avoids the literal language of 
the claim by making a noncritical change.”) (internal citations omitted).  
96 REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 2. 
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(2) a Cas9 protein, which may be modified from wild-type provided 
that the Cas9 retains the ability to form a complex with the DNA-targeting 
RNA, thereby targeting the Cas9 protein to a target DNA sequence in the 
operative environment.97 
 
This outline of essentiality in MPEG LA’s Reference Model is meant to 
encompass all patents essential and complementary to the underlying CRISPR 
platform.98 To collect these platform patents, MPEG LA is seeking “target-agnostic” 
patents that do not require a specific genome.99  
The Reference Model discloses the criteria for pool inclusion, but it does not 
include the terms and conditions that MPEG LA will offer to each potential licensee, 
as that information is still confidential.100 However, evidence of the proposed terms 
can be seen in statements from MPEG LA executives and MPEG LA’s past patent 
pools.101 In a 2017 publication of Science, Lawrence Horn, Chief Executive Officer 
of MPEG LA, stated that “licensing to industry on nonexclusive, cost-effective, 
transparent, and nondiscriminatory terms, including royalty-free research by 
universities” would benefit patent holders and licensees alike.102 Similarly, Kristin 
Neuman stated that MPEG LA’s “initiative” was to provide a “worldwide 
nonexclusive license to multiple patents held by multiple entities in a single 
transaction on nondiscriminatory, transparent, and cost-effective terms.”103 While 
these statements are not official disclosures of the licensing terms MPEG LA will 
use for the CRISPR pool, they are consistent with its prior pools. One can 
hypothesize about the CRISPR pool’s licensing terms by analyzing MPEG LA’s 
past pools and the statements made by Neuman and Horn. 
The licenses issued for the Librassay® pool only included non-exclusive 
licenses covering: “Royalty-Bearing Products” (with the right of use for downstream 
recipients), “Royalty-Bearing Uses,” and “Royalty-Free Research and 
Education.”104 Some of the important terms included: a “Basic Annual Fee” 
consisting of a flat fee per year, per patent (with a maximum fee of $12,500); 
                                               
97 Id. at 3–4.  
98 See id. at 4 (noting that the Reference Model is meant to include all applications of 
CRISPR-Cas9 technologies).  
99 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
100 See REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91.  
101 The past patent pools that I will discuss are the MPEG 2 pool and the Librassay® 
pool. The Librassay® pool is significant for this discussion because it was a for-profit pool 
in the biotechnology arena.  
102 Lawrence Horn, Patent Pools for CRISPR Technology, 355 SCIENCE 1274, 1274 
(2017), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/355/6331/1274.2 [https://perma.cc/W256-
TSQC] (responding to Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate 
Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698 (2017)). 
103 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
104 Librassay® Patent Portfolio License Summary, MPEG LA, LLC 2 (Sept. 12, 2013) 
(on file with author). 
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penalties should the licensee fail to pay the Basic Annual Fee; and a standard royalty 
fee calculated using a set equation.105 In light of the terms of Librassay’s licensing 
agreements and the above-mentioned statements of MPEG LA staff, it seems likely 
that the CRISPR pool will follow a similar structure: a set royalty based on the 
number of patents licensed and the field of use those patents are intended. Like 
Librassay®, and consistent with Horn’s statements, MPEG LA will likely also grant 
royalty-free licenses to research institutions. 
Finally, to ensure that no single party has control over the licensing of the 
package, MPEG LA works with all the included patent holders to create a single set 
of licensing terms and conditions, upon which all of the patent holders must agree.106 
The patent holders also hold most of the enforcement powers. While MPEG LA can 
enforce contractual provisions,107 it does not file patent enforcement lawsuits on its 
own; instead, it must notify the patentees that they may want to file an enforcement 
suit.108 
 
C.  CRISPR Landscape109 
 
1.  The Patent Landscape 
 
To create a sustainable and rewarding patent pool, MPEG LA will have to 
analyze the CRISPR patent landscape to find essential and complementary patents 
for inclusion.110 This is no easy task because, as of May 2018, there were more than 
1,700 applications for “CRISPR patent families,” 111 with around 100 new families 
                                               
105 Id. at 2–3 (noting that the equation used to determine the royalty payment was: 
Royalties = “Royalty Rate” x “Collectibles” for a given Royalty-Bearing Product or Use. 
Where “Royalty Rate” is a predetermined, set value based on the number of patents licensed 
on a royalty bearing product or use in a country. And “Collectibles” is defined as the 
“commercial list price of a Royalty-Bearing Product or Use to the extent paid to Licensee 
directly or indirectly by any party (subject to fair market value determination)”). 
106 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
107 Peter Bright, MPEG LA: 12 Companies Own Patents Essential to Google’s VP8 
Codec, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2011, 10:50 AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/08/mpeg-la-12-
companies-own-patents-essential-to-googles-vp8-codec/ [https://perma.cc/G43E-L9V8]. 
108 Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: MobileMedia’s Unusual Patent Infringement 
Campaign, THE PRIOR ART (Apr. 23, 2010), https://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/ 
2010/04/mobilemedia-ideas-v-apple.html [https://perma.cc/CYG3-QB2L]. 
109 See Corinne Buhan & Fabian Palazzoli, CRISPR PATENT LANDSCAPE, IPSTUDIES 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.ipstudies.ch/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/201801-
CRISPR-Patent-Landscape_Sample.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKJ5-M3JK]. But note that this 
source is only a partial representation of the CRISPR patent landscape as of January 2018 
covering 2,230 patent families worldwide. 
110 See Gilbert, supra note 13, at 25–26; Lawrance et al., supra note 29.  
111 A patent “family” is a set of patent applications which cover similar technical 
material that have been filed in different jurisdictions. Minssen et al., supra note 26. 
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published every month.112 The bulk of these applications have been filed by 
institutional applicants/assignees113 and industrial applicants.114 There are at least 31 
institutional and industrial applicants who have filed at least 14 patent family 
applications as of January 2018.115 The patent claims are equally diverse, covering 
various cells and organisms,116 molecular tools,117 and at least 9 different CRISPR 
applications.118 Even when the scope is narrowed from all CRISPR patent families 
to only CRISPR-Cas9 inventions, there are at least 591 inventions.119 
As noted, the CRISPR landscape is somewhat fragmented with essential and 
complementary patents held by a variety of parties.120 UC Berkeley and the Broad 
Institute of MIT and Harvard (“Broad”) are considered two major players because 
they were some of the first applicants, and their patents claimed broad IPR.121 The 
Berkeley Group (collectively including Inventors Doudna and Charpentier, UC 
Berkeley, and the University of Vienna) and its surrogate, Caribou licensing, has 
rights to at least 80 patent family applications.122 The Berkeley Group’s IPR includes 
one of the first major filings in May 2012, claiming CRISPR-Cas9 system 
prokaryotes, featuring single guide RNA for use in the environment, with the idea 
to use the system as a genetic engineering tool.123 Broad and its surrogate, Editas, 
have IPR to at least 150 patent family applications.124 Broad was another original 
filer, with a priority date of December 2012, claiming IPR to CRISPR-Cas9 
                                               
112 Lawrance et al., supra note 29. 
113 Buhan & Palazzoli, supra note 109, at 5. Institutional applicants make up 60.3% of 
the landscape consisting of 1,345 patent applications. Id. 
114 Id. Industrial applicants make up 31.8% of CRISPR patent applications, consisting 
of 709 filings. Note that the remaining 7.9% of filings in the landscape are done by either 
individual inventors or co-filings between an individual inventor and institutional/industrial 
assignees.  
115 Buhan & Palazzoli, supra note 109, at 7.  
116 Id. at 9. The claims cover cells and organisms including, but not limited to “Human 
cell-subject,” “Mammalian cell-organism,” “Plant cell-organism,” “Eukaryotic cell-
organism,” and “Undefined cell-organism.” Id. 
117 Id. The claims cover a wide variety of “Molecular tools,” including but not limited 
to, “Nuclease,” “Cas-CRISPR enzyme,” and “gRNA-guide sequence.” Id. 
118 Id. These patent applications cover at least 9 different CRISPR applications ranging 
from “Genome editing” to “Therapeutics-Diagnostics” to “Drug screening.” Id. 
119 Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1028.  
120 Buhan & Palazzoli, supra note 109, at 7. MIT has filed the most with over 150 patent 
family filings. Other parties who have filed at least 50 patent families include: Broad – an 
institution of MIT and Harvard – at over 110, Harvard around 110, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS) over 80, Berkeley over 80, The Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
(CAAS) around 70, and Du Pont around 60. 
121 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026–27. 
122 Buhan & Palazzoli, supra note 109, at 7.  
123 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026; see also U.S. Patent No. 10266850 (filed 
Mar. 15, 2013). 
124 Buhan & Palazzoli, supra note 109, at 7. 
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application in eukaryotic cells.125 MPEG LA claims that Broad holds at least 22 
essential patents.126 
However, a successful patent pool will likely not depend on the consent of 
Broad and the Berkeley Group alone.127 There are many parties who hold important 
IPR, including but not limited to Vilnius University, ToolGen, Rockefeller 
University, Cellectis, and MilliporeSigma.128 MilliporeSigma, formerly known as 
Sigma Aldrich, deserves attention because its patent portfolio discloses CRISPR-
Cas9 applications in eukaryotes, which are very similar to what Broad has always 
claimed to be “its pioneering feature over the Berkeley portfolio. . .” potentially 
making a complicated IP situation worse.129 
 
2.  The Licensing Landscape 
 
Large research institutions, like Broad and UC Berkeley, have created 
surrogate companies to help facilitate licensing.130 A surrogate is a “spinoff” 
institution—created by the patent holder and/or one of the principal researchers—
                                               
125 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026; U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (filed Dec. 12, 
2012).  
126 Press Release, Broad Institute, Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard Joins 
Discussions to Create Worldwide Crispr-Cas9 Licensing pool (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.broadinstitute.org/news/broad-institute-mit-and-harvard-joins-discussions-
create-worldwide-crispr-cas9-licensing-pool [https://perma.cc/5KY2-K9GE]. 
127 Ulrich Storz, Crispr Cas9-Licensing What Can’t be Licensed, 53 LES NOUVELLES 
123, 126 (2018). 
128 See id. at 126–28, fig.1 (noting that The University of Vilnius has an earlier priority 
date than Berkeley and Broad, claiming CRISPR methods for in vitro applications with 
disclosures that could be considered the foundation of Berkeley’s patents. ToolGen is a 
Korean company whose patent family disclosed CRISPR applications in eukaryotes by 
means of nuclear localization sequences. ToolGen’s patents have been granted in Korea but 
are still pending in the USA. Rockefeller is a co-inventor with Broad on multiple patents 
involving CRISPR-related technologies); Matthias Blamont, France’s Cellectis Wins U.S. 
Patents For Gene Editing Technology, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2018, 10:02 PM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cellectis-gene/frances-cellectis-wins-u-s-patents-for-
gene-editing-technology-idUSKBN1FX0EO [https://perma.cc/3BS3-RLV4] (discussing 
how Cellectis has patents in both the EU and the U.S. regarding CRISPR tech and T cells, 
“which play a key role in the immune response to cancer . . .”); Corinne Le Buhan, Recent 
Developments in the CRISPR Patent Landscape, IPSTUDIES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ipstudies.ch/2017/03/recent-developments-in-the-crispr-patent-landscape/ 
[https://perma.cc/T94Z-JNGK] (stating that Cellectis may be the only patentee in the EU 
who has a significant position in the CRISPR patent landscape).  
129 Storz, supra note 127, at 126–27.  
130 See Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, And 
Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 (2017) [hereinafter Contreras & Sherkow, 
CRISPR]. 
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which is given exclusive rights including the right to sublicense.131 Essentially, the 
surrogate is created by the patent holder who “effectively outsources the licensing 
and commercialization of a valuable patent portfolio to a private company.”132 This 
model of licensing is common for research institutions “because it gives them a 
substantial share of the profits with minimal” risk and allows them to focus on 
research and innovation.133  
In the CRISPR sphere, surrogates have been granted the exclusive license to 
target or develop “any of the 20,000+ genes” that are included in the human 
genome.134 Due to the broad nature of such a task, the surrogates are expected to 
sublicense, in order to enable other companies to target and develop particular 
genes.135 To date, most of the licensing by these surrogates has been on a non-
exclusive basis in three general fields of use: “(i) basic noncommercial research; (ii) 
development and sale of tools . . . ; and (iii) development, sale, and use of 
therapeutics and treatments . . .”136 While most research users have been granted 
non-exclusive licenses, all human therapeutic applications have been licensed on an 
exclusive basis.137 
 
III.  LICENSING ISSUES FOR A BIOTECH PATENT POOL 
 
While patent pools provide an interesting solution for the licensing of IPR in 
fragmented fields such as CRISPR, there are multiple challenges which could 
impede the pool’s formation. These challenges include: (A) the “Tragedy of the 
Anticommons,” (B) high transaction costs, (C) the nature of biotech and its patents, 
and (D) social and business reasons. 
 
A.  Biotech and the Tragedy of the Anticommons 
 
A cause of growing concern in the CRISPR sphere is what is known as the 
“Tragedy of the Anticommons.”138 The “Anticommons” is the “unfettered exercise 
of individual property rights” that could lead to the “tragic underutilization” of 
knowledge and other resources.139 This underutilization can occur when one party 
                                               
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, Response to Patent Pools for CRISPR 
Technology, 355 SCIENCE 1274, 1274 (2017), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/355/63 
31/1274.2 [https://perma.cc/E5RP-CEFP] [hereinafter Contreras & Sherkow, Response].  
138 See Contreras, supra note 11, at 335 (noting that M.A. Heller and R.S. Eisenberg 
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refuses to license, or only grants exclusive licenses, thus preventing potential 
research and the spread of information.140 The Anticommons could be problematic 
in biotech areas like CRISPR, where research has the potential to save lives, but its 
lucrative nature could prevent broad dissemination.141 There are two reasons the 
Anticommons could affect the CRISPR patent pool: there is a patent thicket, and the 
current licensing model being implemented. 
First, the potential for an Anticommons goes hand-in-hand with a “patent 
thicket.”142 A patent thicket forms when there are overlapping rights in many patents 
belonging to separate patentees, and all of said overlapping rights are required to 
make, use, or sell a product lawfully.143 This patent thicket creates the 
underutilization of IPR because it creates high transaction costs, litigation risks, and 
high royalty rates.144 Basically, in the Anticommons, a potential licensee would need 
to obtain multiple licenses from a large number of licensors who own overlapping 
IPR, creating a system where all IPR is underutilized.145 If all the CRISPR patent 
holders were to license their IPR independently, they could potentially “block others 
from use of the whole.”146 As Professor Jorge Contreras from the University of Utah, 
S.J. Quinney College of Law explains, “if multiple holders of [IPR], particularly 
patents, covering a biomedical technology can individually block others from 
conducting research on that technology, then overall research progress could be 
stifled.”147 As noted above, there is a patent thicket in the CRISPR sphere with some 
fragmentation of IPR.148 CRISPR IPR is fragmented because the technology tends 
to be patented and licensed on a gene-by-gene basis.149  
Second, the worry with the surrogate licensing model currently being used is 
that there may be bottlenecks in research.150 A research bottleneck could occur 
because the exclusive licensing to surrogates has limited the availability of the 
CRISPR technology as an overall platform, and traditional safeguards against the 
                                               
140 Id. at 335–37.  
141 See Contreras, supra note 11, at 337.  
142 Gilbert, supra note 13, at 2.  
143 These rights are “required,” as patent law makes it unlawful for any person to make, 
use or sell a product that is covered by a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). With a patent 
thicket and overlapping IPR, a licensee needs to reach agreements with all parties who have 
rights in the overlapping rights to make, use or sell the product. Gilbert, supra note 13, at 2. 
144 Gilbert, supra note 13.  
145 See Contreras, supra note 11, at 335. 
146 See id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 337; see also discussion, supra Section II.C for a more specific discussion 
about the CRISPR patent landscape. 
149 Contreras, supra note 11, at 337. 
150 Contreras & Sherkow, CRISPR, supra note 130, at 700. 
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overbroad surrogate licenses will not work.151 Patent pools, arguably, could be the 
solution to the potential Anticommons issue. 
 
B.  High Transaction Costs 
 
There are at least two problems for patent pools in biotech which cause high 
transaction costs: (1) the need for market exclusivity, and (2) the interests of the 
patent holders.152  
First, transaction costs tend to be high in biotech for a variety of reasons. 
Usually, there are high costs for product development, required clinical trials, and 
the uncertainty that takes place in biotech research.153 Similarly, regulatory approval 
is necessary for new drugs, treatments, or products before they can hit the market.154 
Due to these high development and regulatory costs, licensees generally require 
some market exclusivity in order to return a profit.155  
Second, high licensing fees can arise in biotech due to the overvaluing of 
IPR.156 Researchers have suggested that the large overestimation of patent value in 
biotech is due to cognitive bias.157 This bias is problematic because essential patent 
owners who overvalue their discoveries force downstream licensees to pay more in 
licensing fees on a product, technique, or discovery that is not guaranteed to be 
commercially successful.158 Similarly, some patentee’s (especially start-ups) only 
                                               
151 See, e.g., id. at 699 (noting how diligence milestones, which “require an exclusive 
licensee to demonstrate progress toward commercialization of a licensed technology,” will 
not work as a safeguard because the surrogates can easily show some progress in the 
incredibly broad field that covers over 20,000 genomes).  
152 See Conteras, supra note 11, at 335–36; Lawrance et al., supra note 29; Minssen et 
al., supra note 26. 
153 Contreras, supra note 11, at 336; see also e.g., Bill Edelman, Explaining the Cost of 
Biotech Therapies, 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 37–41 (May 2004), https://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3555164/ [https://perma.cc/MU86-LJZW] (“[I]t costs, on 
average, $897 million to develop a new drug and bring it to market.”); Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (discussing how transaction costs likely arise early 
in the course of research and development, where the outcome is uncertain, potential 
economic gains are uncertain, and the potential value of any downstream products is equally 
uncertain). 
154 Contreras, supra note 11, at 336.  
155 Id. (noting that market exclusivity is needed based on the very high costs licensees 
must pay in order to get a product to market); Contreras & Sherkow, Response, supra note 
137, at 1274 (discussing how in pharmaceutical and other biotech industries, the licensee is 
only profitable because they can leverage the market using their exclusive rights).  
156 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 701. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (“[I]f each owner overestimates the likelihood that her patent will be the key [to 
a new drug for example], then each will demand more than the probabilistic value, the 
upstream owners collectively will demand more than the aggregate market value of their 
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tangible asset is their IP portfolio.159 Thus, sometimes the optimal use of their IPR 
is to “establish a favorable context for their own products that require other 
companies either to work around them or to seek to license . . . . [T]he prospect of 
putting IP into a pool, and thereby ceding a degree of control and possibly realizing 
less revenue, could make this option less than attractive.”160  
The high licensing costs mentioned above might require a pool to increase its 
royalty rate to financially incentivize potential members to join based on a return 
value that would be higher than said member’s ability to license on their own.161 If 
the pool rate gets too high, potential licensees will seek rates from an independent 
licensor.162 Because exclusive licensing and high transaction costs are contrary to an 
effective patent pool, biotech has not often utilized patent pools.163 Despite all this, 
MPEG-LA believes that they can create a sustainable patent pool that would create 
a one-stop-shop for CRISPR related patents.164 
 
C.  The Nature of Biotech and Biotech Patents 
 
The nature of biotech could be a potential problem for pool formation. First, 
the end products in this field (drugs, human therapeutics, etc.) “are often only loosely 
defined in upstream research.”165 Loosely defined upstream research can create 
problems for defining what is essential.166 Traditionally, patent pools are “product-
based,” meaning essential patents are determined with respect to particular products 
or whether a patent is required for a specific standard.167 However, when the product 
is only loosely defined, and essentiality is difficult to determine, this could result in 
the diminished utility of the pool, as it may be too narrow to be useful for product 
development.168 For example, in the field of genomics, “patents can be so far 
upstream that they do not relate to particular, identifiable products in the same 
concrete ways that we see in traditional cases.”169 Similarly, in the case of the SARS 
patent pool, the strategy was to include only “patents that covered the SARS 
                                               
inputs, the downstream user will decline the offers, and the new drug will not be 
developed.”); see also Zimmerman, supra note 77 for more on the uncertainty of commercial 
success and the interplay with transaction costs.  
159 Levy et al., supra note 53, at 94.  
160 Id.  
161 See Gilbert, supra note 13, at 26–27. 
162 Id.  
163 See Contreras & Sherkow, Response, supra note 137, at 1274 (noting that, due to 
the many licensing problems, it is a question whether patent pooling for CRISPR would 
ultimately be successful). 
164 MPEG LA, CRISPR, supra note 14. 
165 Levy et al., supra note 53, at 93. 
166 Id.  
167 Id. at 84.  
168 Id. at 96. 
169 Id.  
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sequence and the proteins expressed. Thus, much of the development work relating 
to SARS—vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics—would likely have recourse to 
the SARS sequence.”170 However, had the pool included sequence IPR, that would 
have “at least eliminate[d] the growth of thickets in this crucial area.”171  
Secondly, loosely defined upstream research can cause long periods of 
development.172 Biotech patents tend to have “incompleteness,” where further 
innovation must be completed before the final product is embodied and taken to the 
market.173 The incompleteness and long development cycles can make it difficult to 
define what patents are complementary.174 This can be a problem because, if a pool 
does not contain complementary rights, the pool may no longer be a one-stop-shop 
for potential licensees.  
Third, the very nature of the biotech industry can cause licensing problems that 
oppose the formation of a patent pool.175 Biotech does not require the same level of 
“interoperability and compatibility” of IPR that was required in previously 
successful patent pools such as MPEG-2.176 Some researchers have suggested that 
patent pools on non-diagnostic products may not work, due to the lack of alignment 
of industry interests: 
 
When considered from the perspective of the overall biotechnology 
industry, while patent pools may be useful for assembling IP related to 
platform technologies that need to establish industry-wide standards (for 
example, DVD, MP3), the value of patent pooling is much less when 
industry interests are not aligned (still maturing industries), which, indeed, 
is the general case with biotechnology. Hence, in the context of R&D in 
many biotechnological applications . . . industry interests can hardly be 
considered aligned. Indeed, if a technology has not matured to the stage 
where industry standards can even be contemplated, then a patent pool 
would likely not be the favored option.177 
 
D.  Business and Social Reasons for Failure 
 
As noted above, the reasons to join a patent pool are not always financial.178 
That being said, patent pools can fail for a variety of social and business reasons not 
discussed above. In 2008, the Intellectual Property Exchange International, Inc. 
(“IPXI”), was created as a market-based trading platform where licensees could get 
                                               
170 Id. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 93. 
173 Jeitschko & Zhang, supra note 69, at 118. 
174 Levy et al., supra note 53, at 93.  
175 See Minssen et al., supra note 26. 
176 Id. 
177 Jeitschko & Zhang, supra note 69, at 118.  
178 See discussion supra Section II.A.3.  
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a single package of fixed rights under a specified portfolio of patents.179 IPXI was 
created around IEEE’s180 802.11n “Wi-Fi” standard,181 but despite backing from 
several significant patent holders, IPXI ceased operating in March of 2015.182 There 
are several possible reasons for this failure.  
First, some licensees may be unwilling to obtain a license unless they are 
threatened with litigation.183 For IPXI, this may have been a crucial problem because 
IPXI had no history of patent litigation or enforcement, and it makes financial sense 
for a potential licensee to take a “wait-and-see” approach.184 Secondly, the structure 
of IPXI itself was not a true one-stop-shop for manufacturers.185 It did not alleviate 
the burdens of bilateral negotiations because it only prevented licensees from having 
to negotiate with the patentees who joined the group, it was not clear if the patentees 
were the key players in the relevant market, and the packages of IPR did not include 
complementary patents (creating a potential need for more licensing negotiations).186 
Third, IPXI was not attempting to package a new standard; thus, manufacturers 
likely already had years to solidify licensing relationships with key patent holders, 
thereby diminishing any need for IPXI.187 Fourth, the inability of cross-licensing 
prevents parties from using their own patents as an exchange, and “[t]he practice of 
cross-licensing is key to many technology markets, and often results in royalty-free 
                                               
179 Jorge L. Contreras, Frand Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent 
License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419, 421–424 (2016) [hereinafter 
Contreras, IPXI]. It should be made clear that IPXI is not a patent pool per se, but it is similar 
in a number of ways and provides useful insight into social and business reasons as to why 
collaborations of IPR may fail. The differences between IPXI and an ordinary patent pool 
that should be noted include: IPXI’s package licenses could be freely traded or transferred 
by the purchaser, and the pricing was not fixed as it is in a patent pool. Id. at 426.  
180 IEEE is the world’s largest technical professional society, an international standards 
organization “dedicated to advancing innovation and technological excellence for the benefit 
of humanity. . . . It is designed to serve professionals involved in all aspects of the electrical, 
electronic, and computing fields and related areas of science and technology that underlie 
modern civilization.” History of IEEE, IEEE https://www.ieee.org/about/ieee_history.html 
[https://perma.cc/K357-2TAY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
181 802.11n was a standard rolled out by IEEE seeking “to increase the achievable 
speeds of Wi-Fi networks beyond that achievable using” previous IEEE standards 802.11a, 
802.11b, and 802.11g. IEEE 802.11n Standard, ELECTRONICSNOTES, 
https://www.electronics-notes.com/articles/connectivity/wifi-ieee-802-11/802-11n.php 
[https://perma.cc/88YE-SVV4] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).  
182 See Contreras, IPXI, supra note 179, at 419.  
183 Id. at 433. 
184 Id. It should be noted that most licenses are not negotiated or executed only after 
threats of litigation, but IPXI’s executives did state that although they retained the right to 
enforce the patents, “there was no incentive [for potential licensees] to talk without the threat 
of litigation.” Id.  
185 Id. at 434. 
186 Id. at 434–36. 
187 Id. at 435. 
 
556 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
exchanges of patent licenses by market participants.”188 Fifth, there were social 
reasons that may have contributed to IPXI’s 2015 failure, including a general unease 
regarding the value and strength of the patents following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2014 landmark decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,189 as well as the 
uncertainty of joining a complex platform with which lawyers and firms were 
unfamiliar.190  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Will the Pool Work  
 
MPEG LA gained a large swing of momentum in July 2017 when the Broad 
Institute announced that it would join the patent pool.191 Issi Rozen, Broad’s Chief 
Business Officer, has stated Broad’s position on licensing: “The Broad Institute 
already licenses CRISPR-Cas9 non-exclusively for all applications, with the 
exception of human therapeutics, where we have significantly limited the 
exclusivity. We look forward to working with others to ensure the widest possible 
access to all key CRISPR intellectual property.”192  
After Broad’s decision to join the pool, MPEG LA made an “open-call” for all 
patents.193 While Broad’s commitment is a major and necessary step, others have 
stated that UC Berkeley, and possibly all of the Berkeley Group, “must also join in 
order for the pool to be commercially successful,”194 because those parties hold 
patents to some of the underlying technology.195 However, it is unclear if UC 
Berkeley and the Berkeley Group will want to engage in a joint licensing scheme 
                                               
188 Id. at 435–36. 
189 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Alice was a landmark patent case which resulted in more 
software patents being invalidated, “In 2015, over 60 percent of the software patents 
challenged under Alice were found to have at least one claim unpatentable.” Joseph Saltiel, 
In the Courts: Five Years After Alice - Five Lessons Learned from the Treatment of Software 
Patents in Litigation, WIPO Magazine (Aug. 2019), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/ 
en/2019/04/article_0006.html [https://perma.cc/4YDS-5R6Z] 
190 See Contreras, IPXI, supra note 179, at 438–39.  
191 Broad Institute, supra note 126.  
192 Id. 
193 Lawrance et al., supra note 29. 
194 See Minssen et al., supra note 26.  
195 Berkeley scientist Jennifer Doudna described the relationship between UC 
Berkeley’s and Broad’s IPR as UC Berkeley’s rights “will be for all tennis balls and Broad’s 
will be for green tennis balls.” Susan Decker & Michelle Cortez, This Court Battle Will 
Decide Who Will Make a Fortune from Gene-Editing Tech, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-29/berkeley-fights-harvard-mit-over-
profits-from-gene-editing-tech [https://perma.cc/W5SW-WGH9].  
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with Broad because the two institutions only recently ended a long, ongoing patent 
interference dispute, where Broad’s rights were affirmed over UC Berkeley’s.196 
In September 2018, it became public knowledge that Broad, MIT, Harvard, and 
Rockefeller University will participate in MPEG LA’s pool.197 More recently, in 
July of 2019, Broad announced a joint CRISPR licensing framework with 
MilliporeSigma to “encourage innovation.”198 With the intention of streamlining 
access for scientists, this licensing agreement includes IPR from multiple key parties 
including: Broad, Millipore Sigma (under the Sigma-Aldrich portfolio), Harvard 
University, MIT, New York Genome Center, The Rockefeller Center, and more.199 
It is unclear how this new licensing venture will affect Broad’s participation in 
MPEG LA. The press release states that Broad’s intention is to “allow other key 
patent holders to participate in the future – either through this framework or via a 
third-party patent pool collaboration. . . .”200 Lee McGuire, Broad’s Chief 
Communications Officer, reiterated that Broad is “still actively participating in 
patent pool discussions with MPEG LA.”201 While Broad still appears to be a 
member of MPEG LA’s potential pool, if nothing else, this new licensing venture 
raises doubts that key patent holders do not, or have not, come to the table.202 
MPEG LA, however, has stated that they are “in communication” with all 
patent holders that they have determined are critical for the success of the pool.203 
One can infer that Broad’s decision to join MPEG LA was influential in the sphere, 
considering the recent interference determination over Berkeley.204 Kristin Neuman 
said MPEG LA is not waiting on a specific critical mass that must be met before the 
patent pool can go public:  
                                               
196 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (holding that Broad’s patent claims did not interfere with those of Berkeley); Decker 
& Cortez, supra note 195 (noting that the reason the dispute took place is because Broad’s 
“green tennis balls,” which cover most of human therapeutics, could be where the money is).  
197 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
198 Broad Communications, Broad Institute and MilliporeSigma Announce CRISPR 
License Framework to Encourage Innovation, BROAD INST. (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.broadinstitute.org/news/broad-institute-and-milliporesigma-announce-crispr-
license-framework-encourage-innovation [https://perma.cc/M73V-XUTQ]. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. (emphasis added). 
201 E-mail from Lee McGuire, Chief Commc’n Officer, The Broad Inst., to Patrick 
Neville, Student at the S.J. Quinney College of Law (Sept. 6, 2019, 04:02 AM MST) (on file 
with author).  
202 MPEG LA released its own statement after Broad’s decision to create a licensing 
scheme with Millipore Sigma. It is MPEG LA’s opinion that it is still the best option moving 
forward for “maximiz[ing] the benefits of CRISPR” because of its “independence and 
neutrality.” Media/Licensing Programs, MPEG LA (July 25, 2019), https://www.mpegla. 
com/media/ [https://perma.cc/XSM9-RWTL]. 
203 See id.; E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
204 See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1296–97 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that Broad’s patent claims did not interfere with those of Berkeley).  
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There are no firm numbers defining critical mass. Before taking the 
pool public, [MPEG LA] require[s] a package of patent assets that the 
market will deem sufficiently valuable to license on reasonable, 
nonexclusive terms and a set of terms and conditions for the licensing of 
the package upon which all of the patent holders agree . . . . [W]e have the 
former, and are working on the latter.205  
 
Based on Neuman’s statements, one can conclude that MPEG LA is close to 
reaching the pool’s critical mass for going public.206 This means that MPEG LA is 
close to having the essential “patent assets” needed to create a single licensing 
package where licensees will not have to worry about downstream litigation.207 This 
is all well and good, but if the pool does not contain all essential and complementary 
rights, it will not work as intended.  
MPEG LA plans on including those IPR essential and complementary to the 
underlying CRISPR platform.208 Based on the Reference Model, the CRISPR pool 
is constructed to contain only broad, “target-agnostic” patents.209 By including 
foundational, target-agnostic patents, MPEG LA will create a single licensing 
package such that any potential licensee will have the ability to use the technological 
platform.210 However, the Reference Model also preserves the biotech industry’s 
need for exclusivity via “target-specific” patents that will not be included in the 
scope of the pool.211 This sub-category of exclusive licenses gives drug/product 
developers the market leverage required to incentivize the funding and development 
of new products, while still participating in the foundational CRISPR patent pool, 
using the pool license as a research tool.212 These developers could get a license from 
a pool member on an independent basis for specific-target genes or applications as 
necessary.213 This system could create the appropriate balance to effectuate a patent 
pool in the biotech market.214 However, this potential balance could be negated by 
existing exclusive licenses in human therapeutics.215 This would become a problem 
if the exclusive licenses were to create overlapping IPR.216 Neuman does not see 
                                               
205 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
206 Id. Note: MPEG LA was specifically asked for a list of participating patent holders 
but was informed that those not already listed in this paper requested to remain confidential.  
207 See id.  
208 See REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 1–3. 
209 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
210 See id.; REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 2–3. 
211 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15; REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 
91, at 2–3. 
212 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
213 See id. 
214 Id. 
215 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
216 Id. 
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these existing licenses as an issue: “[C]ompanies would benefit from a CRISPR 
patent pool that would provide a nonexclusive license to CRISPR as a research tool, 
and it would appear that many of the exclusive licenses already granted in the 
CRISPR field would permit this field of use to be included in a pool license.”217  
Ideally, the pool’s broad coverage would create a diverse market because it is 
broad enough to facilitate parallel development.218 Parallel development allows 
multiple licensees to develop multiple applications at the same time, while the patent 
holder can spread their risk through constant royalty streams from the multiple 
parallel licensees.219 But considering how rapidly the patent landscape is growing,220 
there are other licensing issues that could be problematic in application. Without 
specifics on who and what IPR is contained in the pool, the ability to generate a one-
stop-shop for CRISPR technology will remain in doubt. Similarly, if Broad’s new 
licensing scheme with Millipore Sigma alters its participation, the pool will likely 
not have the essential IPR necessary to be effective. However, should the pool go 
public, it could alleviate many licensing concerns including: (1) fragmentation and 
downstream litigation, (2) the Tragedy of the Anticommons, and (3) licensor issues. 
Some researchers have suggested that a successful patent pool could do more than 
solve licensing issues; it could also alleviate ethical concerns221 and judicial 
intervention.222  
                                               
217 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. (noting that this method of licensing also benefits the public by allowing the 
creation of multiple products at the same time thus bringing new products and services to the 
market faster at a lower price).  
220 See discussion supra Section II.E. 
221 While this topic is largely outside the scope of this paper, many scientists and 
lawmakers ethically criticize the use of CRISPR technologies because of its potential to make 
germline edits and therapies too simple. See David Baltimore et al., CRISPR Controversy, 
THE TRANSLATION SCIENTIST (Jan. 21, 2016), https://thetranslationalscientist.com/issues/01 
16/crispr-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/Q49M-DM92]. However, MPEG LA and its 
potential licensors could potentially solve said ethical dilemmas through ethical constraints 
in their licensing agreement. In fact, Broad has used ethical limitations in their licensing 
agreements by granting licenses for only very specific applications. See Storz, supra note 
127, at 125 (discussing Broad’s non-exclusive licensing with Bayer for specific agricultural 
applications such as genetic modification of plant varieties, and Broad’s licensing agreement 
with its surrogate, Editas, which states that Editas may “use or outlicense the technology to 
modify human germ cells or embryos for any purpose.”). Similarly, a successful patent pool 
could provide constraints on “legal grey area[s]” by imposing licensing constraints on ethical 
concerns where lawmakers are behind the rapidly expanding technology. See id. at 1025.  
222 While this topic is largely outside the scope of this paper, licensing bottlenecks in 
human health and wellbeing research and products has provoked judicial and policy activity. 
See Anja von der Ropp & Tony Taubman, Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of Myriad, 
WIPO MAGAZINE (Aug. 2006), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/04/article00 
03.html [https://perma.cc/F3Z5-M78F] (noting that the debate about the validity of Myriad’s 
patents stemmed from their licensing policies, which demanded incredibly high prices and 
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1.  A Patent Pool Could Alleviate Fragmentation and Litigation Concerns 
 
As discussed above, the CRISPR patent landscape is complex,223 and any use 
in this field without a proper license could result in litigation; “[the] [f]reedom to 
operate will not be possible without multiple licenses.”224 Even if a company were 
able to obtain these multiple licenses, royalty stacking, multiple negotiations, and 
diligence operations would be very burdensome.225 Generally, exclusive patent 
licenses in lucrative fields create potential litigation, heightening the likelihood that 
the patent will be questioned in court by those whom the licensing scheme excludes 
from the field.226  
However, inclusion in the market will be emphasized in MPEG LA’s patent 
pool because it issues only non-exclusive licenses.227 Because this license will 
contain the IPR needed for the CRISPR platform, downstream users will not have 
to worry about litigation on general CRISPR technology applications.228 If Neuman 
is correct and current exclusive licensees “would permit” research uses “to be 
included in [the] pool license,” the fear of downstream litigation will be non-existent 
for all research applications of the platform.229 Thus, the downstream research and 
product development could increase as the pool’s license opens “alternative paths 
for the development of new therapies, creating alternative product and royalty 
revenue streams, and reducing the potential for patent enforcement activity.”230 
  
                                               
essentially prevented other laboratories across the country from practicing the diagnostic 
testing); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 583, 
590–94 (2013) (holding that crucial discoveries of specific DNA locations enabling Myriad 
to develop medical tests that are useful for detecting whether the patient has an increased 
risk of cancer were not patentable); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
566 U.S. 66, 74–75 (2012) (noting how exclusive licensee sued licensor for patent 
infringement, while licensor claimed that the patents involved in the parties’ licensing 
agreement were invalid). Such judicial activity can result in the “severe curtailment or all-
out loss of patent rights” which can greatly impede the economy or innovation. E-mail from 
Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. The licensing balance struck by patent pools allows licensors 
and licensees to be in “concert with the market” and attain their financial and technological 
advancements without the need for judicial intervention. Id.; see also Horn, supra note 102. 
223 See discussion, supra Section II.E. 
224 KRISTIN NEUMAN, WHAT COULD A PATENT POOL DO FOR THE PROMISE OF 
CRISPR?, MPEG LA 9 (2017), http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/CRISPR_Neum 
an.pdf [perma.cc/X62E-QN33]. 
225 Id. at 9. 
226 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
227 Id.  
228 See id.; REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 2. 
229 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
230 Id.; see REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 2–3.  
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2.  A Patent Pool Could Alleviate Anticommons Concerns 
 
A patent pool may resolve the fear that exclusive licensing would lead to the 
underutilization of the technology and the stifling of innovation and research.231 
While exclusive licenses have generally been utilized in biotech in the past, such a 
system is a deterrent in the CRISPR field because the technology constitutes such a 
fundamental platform that only a broad, non-exclusive licensing system could 
support the “vast potential” of industries, ranging from healthcare to agriculture.232 
In biotech, non-exclusive licensing schemes have been shown to enable numerous 
companies to enter the market, creating a “commercial ecosystem” that enhanced 
innovation and the economy.233  
MPEG LA’s non-exclusive patent pool could not only alleviate the 
Anticommons concerns, but may expand and accelerate the commercialization of 
CRISPR products and therapies.234 Potentially, the market will be accelerated by the 
pool because the terms MPEG LA is purporting to use will result in the broad 
dissemination of the CRISPR platform.235 According to statements by Horn and 
Neuman,236 the license terms may be non-exclusive, cost-effective, transparent, 
nondiscriminatory, and include royalty-free research for universities. 237 Such terms 
could decrease the potential for downstream litigation, allowing more licensees to 
enter the market and, without the fear of litigation, the relevant market should 
become more stable.238 This stability, coupled with easy and cost-effective 
packaging, would free up resources, allowing firms to focus on research, product 
                                               
231 See Horn, supra note 102, at 700 (noting that even before CRISPR related tech had 
been developed, the National Institutes of Health has recommended that patents on the 
research tools, especially those developed through federal funding, be licensed on a non-
exclusive basis to allow the promotion of their “greatest utilization, commercialization and 
public availability.”); E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15 (discussing how MPEG 
LA is attempting to license the CRISPR platform that has many broad applications).  
232 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
233 Non-exclusive licensing schemes have been effective in the past, specifically, “[the] 
regime put in place by Stanford University for the Cohen-Boyer patents protecting the 
recombinant DNA technology platform set the stage for the rise of the modern biotechnology 
industry in America.” See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
The scheme generated more than $35 billion in sales and the creation of over 2400 new 
products. Id. It is important to note, however, that the Cohen-Boyer scheme was not a patent 
pool, rather a system designed around minimizing licensing fees and the use of non-exclusive 
licensing agreements. Clark et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
234 Horn, supra note 102.  
235 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15; NEUMAN, supra note 224, at 9. 
236 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15; Horn, supra note 102. 
237 Letter from Horn, supra note 102 (noting however that to make these lofty goals a 
reality, they must be able to pool all the essential patents).  
238 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
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development, or product quality.239 This patent pool scheme would allow companies 
to innovate more effectively, creating new products and techniques that would not 
have been discovered or produced under an exclusive licensing system.240 
 
3.  Incentives for Patentees to Join 
 
A patent pool is the most practical option moving forward for a broad platform 
like CRISPR because of the licensing balance between future innovation and the 
financial return for IPR holders.241 The pool’s balance hinges on the financial return 
to patentees while providing cost-effectiveness and associability to potential 
licensees.242  
To alleviate financial concerns held by patentees, MPEG LA will attempt to 
provide royalty rates higher than what a patent holder could make on their own.243 
As discussed above, MPEG LA believes the pool will create a more diverse market 
with more licensees.244 More licensees would allow the pool to generate more 
royalties due to the larger number of participating licensees.245 Accordingly, if the 
pool creates a large, steady stream of licensees, the royalties from the pool will be 
larger and more stable than what a licensor could achieve based on a single or small 
number of exclusive licensees.246 Neuman suggests that there will be “a steady 
stream of predictable pool royalties from hundreds of licensees starting from day 1 
of the pool’s existence.”247  
CRISPR patentees seek to spread the CRISPR platform. Because the pool will 
include patents revolving around CRISPR’s underlying platform,248 patentees may 
join to create an industry platform that only utilizes their IPR. The CRISPR pool is 
not only being created to lower transaction costs (a happy side-effect), but also to 
create the widespread use of the CRISPR platform for innovation.249  
As noted above, the majority of patentees in this sphere are research 
institutions.250 These institutions may prefer a third-party agent such as MPEG LA 
to conduct licensing for ease of administration, as evidenced by the fact that some 
                                               
239 See id. (noting that the stable market and reasonable terms created by the patent pool 
should make the entire licensing, research and development process faster); Horn, supra note 
102. 
240 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
241 Id.  
242 See Gilbert, supra note 13, at 26; Horn, supra note 102.  
243 Gilbert, supra note 13, at 26. 
244 See discussion, supra Section IV.A.2. 
245 See E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
246 See id.; Gilbert, supra note 13, at 26–27.  
247 E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15. 
248 See REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 2–3.  
249 See Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
250 See discussion supra Section II.C.1 noting how the major players in the CRISPR 
sphere include the research institutions of MIT, Harvard, and Berkeley to name a few.  
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patentees, including UC Berkeley and Broad, already created surrogate companies 
for this very purpose,251 and Broad has already decided to join MPEG LA.252 
Because CRISPR is a foundational tool,253 many patentees may join the pool to 
disseminate information for open science,254 philanthropic reasons,255 or to ease all 
parties’ licensing costs.256 
As shown by the drawn-out legal proceeding between Broad and UC 
Berkeley,257 parties in the CRISPR sphere are willing to fight for their IPR in the 
open market (due to its potentially lucrative nature). Thus, patentees may join the 
pool based on the short-term goal of avoiding litigation.258 Joining the pool would 
help avoid litigation because inclusion in the pool would likely result in grantback 
licenses.259 Grantback licenses would give patentees access to the technology 
without having to conduct licensing negotiations or engage in litigation.  
Regardless of the potential philanthropic interests at play, MPEG LA has 
repeatedly stated they will use “cost-effective” terms,260 meaning the pool will not 
be licensed on a royalty-free basis. There may be some philanthropic goal for 
dissemination, due to CRISPR’s potential medical benefits.261 But, unlike the 
Golden Rice Pool and the SARS pool, the CRISPR pool is not being formed to solve 
a single specific need.262  
 
                                               
251 See discussion supra Section II.E.1 noting how UC Berkeley and Broad already 
created surrogate companies to handle the licensing involved with their CRISPR patents. 
252 See Press Release, supra note 126.  
253 See Email from Kristin Neuman supra note 15; Doudna supra note 4 (discussing the 
possible uses of CRISPR technology).  
254 See Levy et al., supra note 53, at 81 (discussing how research firms may use patent 
pools as a way to advance science).  
255 See Mattioli, supra note 22, 145 (noting how philanthropic reasons can induce 
patentees to join a pool to provide medical technologies to developing nations).  
256 Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 324 (showing how a pool could save hundreds 
of millions of dollars).  
257 See Regents, supra note 196.  
258 See Mattioli, supra note 22, at 120.  
259 See Mattioli & Merges, supra note 21, at 297 (discussing how grantback licenses 
and potential litigation are factors considered before joining a pool because it gives the 
patentee IPR they thought they already had or want).  
260 Horn, supra note 102; E-mail from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
261 See supra note 4 for a discussion on the potential medical uses of CRISPR 
technology.  
262 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (noting that the SARS pool was 
created in an attempt to get cheap vaccines to developing nations in order to quell a SARS 
outbreak and the Golden Rice pool was created to provide access to the patents needed to 
grow Golden Rice to prevent an eating deficiency causing blindness in children in developing 
nations); Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15 (noting that the CRISPR patent pool is 
designed around the foundational CRISPR platform which has countless applications, not a 
single specific need).  
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B. Why the Pool May Fail 
 
While there may be potential benefits of a patent pool, there is no guarantee it 
will work. First, this pool’s formation is different than past successful for-profit 
pools in biotech such as Librassay®. The CRISPR pool is not being formed around 
a technology whose sole purpose is diagnostics.263 Unlike Librassay®, there is no 
“common goal” among market players,264 nor is the pooled technology component-
based.265 The lack of component-based standardization could be a problem for the 
CRISPR pool because biotech does not have the same level of interoperability and 
compatibility of previous successful patent pools like MPEG-2.266 There is no 
technological standard here, which Neuman states is “main challenge” for biotech 
pools because it makes determining essentiality difficult.267  
Similarly, the CRISPR technology could pose problems determining 
essentiality and complementarity if the relevant patents define loose, upstream 
research. If the CRISPR pool does indeed fail to include all essential and 
complementary patents, then the CRISPR pool, like the SARS pool, would likely 
fail because it would not eliminate the current patent thicket.268 Such a result would 
negate the basic concept of the pool, as parties would no longer have the convenience 
of one-stop-shopping.269 However, the Reference Model is designed in an attempt 
to prevent such an outcome. The pool’s inclusion—“intend[ing] to encompass the 
[CRISPR] system in its entirety as well as the [RNA elements]”—covers the 
underlying platform that must be utilized regardless of the application.270  
Second, patentees may not be incentivized to join the pool. While large royalty 
returns will likely warrant pool inclusion, in practice such royalties will not be 
guaranteed. The CRISPR sphere, so far, has received little to no government 
pressure, and no incentive programs (unlike the NTD pool) have been put in place. 
                                               
263 See Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
264 See discussion, supra Section II.C.1 (discussing the many different applications that 
CRISPR related patents have been filed to cover).  
265 See Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15 (noting that the CRISPR patent pool 
is designed around the foundational CRISPR platform which has countless applications). 
266 Timo Minssen, Esther van Zimmeren & Jakob Wested, Opportunities and 
Challenges for User-Generated Licensing Models in Gene-Editing, BILL OF HEALTH (July 
14, 2018), http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/14/could-user-generated-
licensing-models-help-us-to-clear-a-path-through-the-crispr-patent-jungle/ [https://perma. 
cc/QG7Z-23J8]; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
267 Email from Kristen Neuman, supra note 15. 
268 See Levy et al., supra note 48, at 96 (noting how the SARS pool formation did not 
correctly determine the necessary essential and complementary patents, resulting in the 
continued existence of a patent thicket and the pool’s failure).  
269 See Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations, supra note 22, at 125–26 (describing 
how the single package of rights allows licensees to overcome patent licensing roadblocks, 
reduce transaction costs and promote information exchange).  
270 REFERENCE MODEL, supra note 91, at 4.  
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Similarly, there does not seem to be much philanthropic pressure. While a royalty-
free patent pool in the CRISPR sphere would be advantageous for society, no one is 
expecting or calling for this result as the technology is too lucrative.  
Third, the pool may fail for business and social reasons. The CRISPR pool has 
some stark similarities to IPXI, which failed, as explained above. Like IPXI, the 
CRISPR pool has received support from several significant players271 but, just like 
IPXI, the CRISPR pool may not have the support of all the key players.272 As of 
now, it is unclear whether UC Berkeley will join a joint licensing venture with the 
likes of the Broad Institute after the two entities’ ongoing patent interference 
recently ended in favor of Broad.273 Should UC Berkeley opt out of the pool, the 
packaged license may no longer allow for one-stop-shopping, and parties would still 
need to negotiate a license with Berkeley and others. 274 This could be devastating 
for the CRISPR pool’s success because UC Berkeley is still considered to have key 
IPR, even after losing the interference with Broad.275 Similarly, non-joining parties 
may own rights complementary to the CRISPR platform, which would result in the 
same need for multiple negotiations.276 Similarly, CRISPR technology is only 
relatively new, but possibly not new enough for the purposes of a patent pool’s 
success.277 Many large corporations, firms, and institutions, like the WIFI sphere for 
IPXI,278 have likely already had a few years to solidify relationships with patent 
holders for licensing purposes.279 This reduces the need for a patent pool as licensees 
would already have the channels required to get the necessary licenses from the 
multiple patentees.280  
                                               
271 See Broad Institute, supra note 126 (disclosing Broad’s intention to join MPEG LA’s 
pool).  
272 See Email from Neuman, supra note 15 (noting that most members or potential 
members of the pool are still confidential); Minssen et al., supra note 26 (claiming that UC 
Berkeley has currently not agreed to join the pool, and they must join for the pool to be a 
success). 
273 See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1296–
97 (upholding Broad’s patent rights over Berkeley’s).  
274 Minssen et al., supra note 26 (claiming that UC Berkeley, regardless of the recent 
interference determination, still has key patent rights that should be included in the pool). 
275 Id.  
276 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 134–35 (noting IPR might be useless without 
complementary rights).  
277 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026 (stating that UC Berkeley and Doudna 
invented CRISPR technologies in June of 2012).  
278 See Contreras, IPXI, supra note 179, at 435.  
279 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026 (noting that CRISPR was invented in June of 
2012); Contreras & Sherkow, CRISPR, supra note 130, at 698 (discussing the many licensing 
uses of Broad and the Berkeley Group since 2012).  
280 See Egelie et al., supra note 1, at 1026; Contreras & Sherkow, CRISPR, supra note 
130, at 698. 
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Fourth, like IPXI, MPEG LA has the ability to enforce the pooled patents with 
the patentees.281 The question is whether this ability will prevent licensees from 
continuing to use technology covered by the pool in a wait-and-see approach—in 
other words, whether potential licensees will just use the technology without a 
license because they believe litigation is not a likely result.282 This wait-and-see 
approach, if similar to IPXI’s situation, may allow potential licensees to use the 
technology without getting a license from the pool. Or, as mentioned above, if the 
patentees are unwilling to enforce the patents, MPEG LA may be unable to do so. 
This inability to enforce patents would not generate more licensees, as there would 
be no need to pay for a license. Similarly, there are still current exclusive licensees 
in the field who may consider the pool license an infringement.283 Although Neuman 
stated that current licensees may be willing to allow the packaged license for certain 
fields of use (research),284 that is not a guarantee. Should the current exclusive 
licensees have a problem, there may still be a threat of downstream litigation, 
disincentivizing firms from joining the pool.  
Finally, and maybe most simply, MPEG LA may not get enough IPR holders 
to come to the table. Broad’s decision to join was a major step forward, but recent 
information has cast doubt. Broad’s decision to launch its own licensing venture 
with Millipore Sigma285 raises questions. Even if Broad is still actively participating 
in MPEG LA’s pool,286 it is unlikely they would need to create the Millipore Sigma 
scheme if the MPEG LA pool was moving forward or close to going public. To be 
effective, the pool would require enough essential IPR holders to alleviate licensing 
burdens and costs.287 Without enough essential IPR holders, the pool will likely be 
unable to establish the economic stability required to stay viable.  
 
                                               
281 For a recent list of legal action taken by MPEG LA, see Media, MPEG LA, 
https://www.mpegla.com/media-legal-action/ [perma.cc/E34C-89KP] (last visited Sept. 11, 
2019). For a specific example, see Ed Bott, Google and MPEG LA Settle Long-running 
VP8/H.264 Patent Dispute, ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-
and-mpeg-la-settle-long-running-vp8h-264-patent-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/M98V-A5VB] 
(noting that MPEG LA has the power to enforce the patents included in its pool).  
282 See Contreras, IPXI, supra note 179, at 433 (discussing how the threat of litigation 
is one reason why potential licensees decided not to purchase a license, deciding to use a 
wait and see approach instead).  
283 See Contreras & Sherkow, CRISPR, supra note 130, at 698 (discussing the many 
licensing uses of Broad and the Berkeley Group since 2012); Email from Kristin Neuman 
supra note 15 (discussing the potential for current licensees to allow research in their fields 
of use).  
284 Email from Kristin Neuman, supra note 15.  
285 Broad Communications, supra note 198.  
286 See E-mail from Lee McGuire, Chief Commc’n Officer, The Broad Inst., to Patrick 
Neville, Student at the S.J. Quinney College of Law (Sept. 6, 2019, 04:02 AM MST) (on file 
with author).  
287 See Gilbert, Collective Rights Organizations, supra note 22, at 125–26 (noting how 
it is the single package of rights that allows licensees to overcome patent licensing 
roadblocks, reduce transaction costs and promote information exchange). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, MPEG LA’s CRISPR patent pool is a promising approach to solving a 
complex licensing problem in a budding technological area. There are many factors 
that could lead to the pool’s success if it can overcome the many hurdles with 
pooling patents in the biotech sphere. Should the pool be successful, it could enhance 
innovation and provide a lucrative research tool at an affordable price. A patent 
pool’s ability to conserve transaction costs and increase innovation make it an 
appealing licensing scheme for a patent landscape such as CRISPR. However, the 
nature of the biotech industry, the whims of each essential patentee, and many social 
and business reasons could impede the pool’s success. Regardless, the pool is an 
interesting approach to solving a complex licensing problem. 
